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Introduction 
 
By any measure, John Carver has had a substantial impact on thinking about governance 
in nonprofits.  He has authored three books, 14 monographs and over 160 separate 
articles, as well as a regular newsletter, audiotapes and a videotape (Carver 2002, pp. xli-
xlii).  His first book Boards that make a difference was reprinted 10 times before going into 
its second edition.  He has consulted in over 19 countries.   He has trained over 150 
consultants (including the author) and other nonprofit leaders in his advanced Academy 
workshop, some of whom went on to form the International Policy Governance 
Association.  His influence in Canada in particular has been profound, with one report 
noting that many Canadian organisations had debated whether ‘to Carver, or not’ (Panel 
on accountability and governance in the voluntary sector 1998, p. 15).  His work has 
inspired books by other authors (Oliver 1999; Walters & Richardson 1997). 
 
Probably no other writer on governance has attracted so much publicity, or such 
controversy, as Carver.  As Fletcher (1999, p. 437) notes, Carver’s approach has been 
‘both lauded and demonized’.  
 
After explaining the basic principles and structure of Policy Governance, this paper briefly 
summarises the advantages of the model.  It then examines how poorly the model is 
understood by some of its critics.  The paper then explores in detail the negative critiques 
of Carver’s writing on governance and of his Policy Governance model.  Most of the critics 
are explicit in their comment on Carver’s work, although one or two critiques have been 
implied from the general management literature.  It should be noted that some of the 
negative critiques contradict others.  Conclusions in relation to practice and research are 
then drawn. 
 
The Policy Governance Model 
 
Policy Governance is essentially a sophisticated ‘management by objectives’ approach to 
governance.   
 
Carver writes that there are ten basic principles on which his model is built (Carver & 
Carver 1996a). 
 
First, the board governs on behalf of people who are not at the board table.  As 
trusteeship forms the foundation of governance, the board must establish, maintain, clarify 
and protect the relationship of trust with the legal and moral owners of the organisation. 
 
Second, the board should speak with one voice.  The power of directors is not as 
individuals, but as a corporate entity. 
 
Third, board decisions should predominantly be policy decisions.  Even in very small 
organisations, it is not possible for the board to control every interaction between the 
organisation and the world.  Policies give the board the best means to frame the 
organisation’s interactions. 
 
Fourth, boards should formulate policies in layers, starting from broad statements and 
working down in logical succession.  By starting broad, Carver argues that there is never 
a policy vacuum.  
 
Fifth, the board should ‘define and delegate, rather than react and ratify’ (Carver & Carver 
1996a, p. 9). 
 
Sixth, the main game is the ends to be achieved, that is, the outcomes not the process. 
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Seventh, the board’s best control over the means used by staff is to proscribe, not 
prescribe.  Thus the board maintains prudent control of the organisation by putting certain 
actions off limits, while not unduly interfering in the work of staff. 
 
Eighth, boards should explicitly design their own products and process. 
 
Ninth, the link between the board and the CEO must be empowering and safe.  It should 
be empowering, in that the CEO should not be subject to second-guessing about 
individual decisions, provided his or her decisions are consistent with any reasonable 
interpretation of the board’s policy (Carver 2002, pp. 347 –352).  The link should be safe, 
in that the CEO’s decisions and actions must be within policy. 
 
Tenth, CEO performance must be monitored rigorously, but only against policy criteria 
explicitly established by the board. 
 
Carver posits that every board has at least three jobs (Carver & Carver 1996b, pp. 6-7).  
First, the board must link to the legal and moral ownership of the organisation.  Second, 
the board should produce explicit governing policies.  Third, the board should assure CEO 
performance by establishing clear expectations for performance and clear mechanisms 
for accountability. 
 
Under Policy Governance, policies are developed in four areas: 
 
• Ends: The board defines which human needs are to be met, for whom, and at 
what cost.  Written from a long-term perspective, these mission-related 
policies embody most of the board’s part of long-range planning. 
• Executive Limitations: The board establishes the boundaries of acceptability 
within which staff methods and activities can be responsibly left to staff. 
• Board-CEO linkage: The board clarifies the manner in which it delegates 
authority to staff as well as how it evaluates staff performance on provisions of 
the Ends and Executive Limitations policies. 
• Governance process: The board determines its philosophy, its accountability, 
and specifics of its own job.  (Carver 2001, p. 3) 
 
Advantages of Policy Governance 
 
The potential advantages of Policy Governance are fairly evident just from its description. 
 
• It emphasises the role of the board as trustees on behalf of the legal and moral 
ownership of the organisation. 
• The model requires the board to be explicit about its values for the governance of the 
organisation. 
• The roles of the board in governance and of the CEO in management are clarified. 
• The model avoids the twin evils that plague boards: namely micromanagement, on the 
one hand, and rubber-stamping, on the other. 
• The outcomes that the organisation seeks to achieve are clearly stated, and thus the 
model provides a sound basis for understanding what constitutes successful 
organisational performance. 
• The executive limitations approach to delegation is, perhaps paradoxically, 
empowering of the CEO. 
• The model fosters responsibility and provides a systematic basis for the achievement 
of accountability. 
• Boards are encouraged to be future-focussed. 
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Despite these potential advantages, the model has been subject to extensive criticism by 
some academic commentators.  Some of these critiques are informed, and some are not. 
 
Poor understanding of the model 
 
Much of the writing on Carver and Policy Governance is based on a poor, or an 
incomplete, understanding of his work and the model.  This includes the otherwise 
thoughtful Bradshaw and colleagues, who confused traditional governance and Policy 
Governance (1998, pp. 13-14).   
 
Perhaps the worst example of understanding Carver’s work is the review by Leland 
(1997).  Leland asserts that it is Carver’s view that: 
 
The board should not get involved in any management issue unless the policies 
have been violated.  This translates to boards not getting involved in elaborating 
on strategic priorities, evaluating programs, raising monies, monitoring budgets, 
setting personnel policies, and so forth. (Leland 1999, pp. 194-195) 
 
The table on the following page analyses each of Leland’s claims: note that all of the 
quotes from Carver are from the very book that Leland had purportedly read. 
 
This example clearly establishes that some of the critiques of Carver’s views and of Policy 
Governance are based on a misunderstanding of the model.  Of course, everyone is 
entitled to a point of view - a well-informed point of view. 
 
Informed critiques 
 
There is no guarantee that things will not go wrong 
Carver (2002, p. 47) himself acknowledges that things can go ‘horribly wrong’ in Policy 
Governance.  He states that Policy Governance ‘does not guarantee wise governance’ 
(Carver 2002, p. 51).  In his view, the model merely enables it.   Carver argues that partial 
implementation is especially problematic, but acknowledges things can still go wrong 
when the model is fully implemented.  He identifies the following sources of potential 
failure, even if the technical implementation is correct: 
 
• a focus on the short term, perhaps encouraged by a short term of office of the board 
or inappropriate anxiety about measurement  
• narrow vision and limited ambition when setting Ends1 policies 
• insufficient constraint on staff means (the opposite of micromanagement), and 
• not monitoring often enough. (Carver 2002, pp. 48-50) 
 
Of course, this critique does not invalidate the model; it merely points out the limits of the 
model.  Given that many critics believe that Carver’s view is that there is only ‘one best 
way’, Carver’s explicit acknowledgement of the limitations of the model is welcome. 
                                                
1 The word ‘Ends’ will be capitalised when referring to Ends policies within Policy Governance, but 
not capitalised when using it in the common way of the distinction between ends and means. 
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Table 1: Analysis of one assertion by Leland 
 
Leland’s claim Current author’s comment What Carver says 
This translates to 
boards not getting 
involved in 
elaborating on 
strategic priorities 
Some validity to comment.  
Carver’s concern is the nature of 
the board’s involvement in 
strategising.  The Board would be 
involved in elaborating on what is 
to be achieved through the Ends 
policies, but would not become 
involved in elaborating on means 
except by the executive limitations 
policies.  The potential problems 
with this approach will be 
explored when discussing the 
‘fallacy of predetermination’. 
In short, the board’s job is not 
long-range planning itself, but 
exploration of vision.  The board’s 
job is to maintain and behaviorally 
demonstrate a long-range 
mentality. (Carver 1997, p. 68) 
evaluating programs Wrong.  Carver’s concern is that 
the board should be more 
concerned with evaluating 
outcomes than second-guessing 
process. 
Evaluation of Ends is an integral 
part of the management process. 
(Carver 1997, p. 68) 
 
raising monies Wrong. Should a board be responsible for 
fundraising?  The answer 
depends on the organization and 
its circumstances.  From the 
perspective of governance 
concepts per se, one can only say 
that fundraising may be either 
delegated or retained, at the 
board’s discretion. (Carver 1997, 
p. 133) 
monitoring budgets Wrong. Monitoring information is used to 
gauge whether previous board 
directions have been satisfied … 
Good monitoring information is a 
systematic survey of performance 
against criteria. (Carver 1997, p. 
109) 
setting personnel 
policies 
Wrong. See the examples of personnel 
policies set out in Carver 1997, 
pp. 96-97. 
and so forth Wrong. See the examples of common 
executive limitation policies set 
out in Carver 1997, pp. 87-88. 
 
The Policy Governance model is based on a traditional, mechanistic top-down view 
of organisations 
This critique is implied in the work of Blair and Stout (1999, pp. 262) and made explicitly 
by Herman and Heimovics (1991, pp. 38, 44) and Bradshaw et al (1995, pp. 6-7). 
 
There are several responses to this critique.  First, Carver is not attempting to propose an 
all-embracing theory of nonprofit organisation, but merely a theory in relation to the role of 
the board.  Second, despite Blair and Stout’s argument that the legal role of shareholders 
is overstated, the reality is that shareholders/members have more extensive legal rights 
than other stakeholder groups.  Third, outside of general meetings, the legal powers of the 
organisation are typically vested in boards and, in order to be further vested in other 
stakeholder groups, must be delegated by the board to them.  Hierarchy is inevitable in 
Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies  Working Paper No. CPNS6 
 
 5
corporations, a point which Blair and Stout (1999, p. 281) and Herman and Heimovics 
(1991, p. 41) acknowledge.  Fourth, Policy Governance empowers the CEO (and through 
the CEO, the staff) to pursue the Ends of the organisation, provided the Executive 
Limitations policies are not breached.  
 
The model looks at the organisation in isolation 
This is a critique made explicitly by Bradshaw et al, and Hind.  Bradshaw et al (1995, p. 
13) position Policy Governance at the unitary end of the unitary-pluralistic range.  Hind 
(1995, p. 16) notes that Carver’s views ‘are invariably focused on the charity as an 
individual entity’.    
 
It is true that the model principally seeks to answer the question of how a board should 
seek to govern the organisation, rather than how the board should relate to the outside 
world.  Carver (1997, p. 138) identifies advocacy (‘legislative impact’), fundraising and 
public relations as optional board responsibilities in the sense that the board can retain 
responsibility for their achievement or can delegate responsibilities to the CEO and staff.  
He also explicitly acknowledges the importance of interboard dialogue, noting that it can 
have ‘momentous effect’ (Carver 1997, p. 198).  While interaction with the external 
environment is not built specifically into the diagrammatic representation of the model, it 
would be easy to do so.   
 
Governance is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for success of 
nonprofits, and boards also need to be involved in management  
Hind (1995, p. 15) argues that organisations can implement the four quadrants of Policy 
Governance, but still have poor organisational performance if management techniques 
are inadequate.  He goes on to argue that it is unhelpful to think about governance in 
isolation.   
 
Carver would agree with the first leg of the argument, but would take a different 
perspective on the second.  Giving the example of the United Way scandal, he argued 
that there was a failure of governance to set the constraints on CEO action and to create 
and enforce the reporting systems that would detect the failure of management (Carver 
2002, p. 401). 
 
While there is an element of ideological correctness in Carver’s analysis, there is much to 
be said for the board staying largely within the governance role and requiring the Chief 
Executive Officer (hereafter, ‘CEO’) to learn and practice the art of management.  It 
means that both parties are clear on expectations and clear on their respective roles.  
While CEOs can seek out advice from individual board members in relevant areas of 
expertise, CEOs are not required to follow well-meaning but nonetheless sometimes 
unhelpful and contradictory ‘advice’ from individual board members. 
 
Contrary to Carver’s assertions, there can be no “one best way” 
This critique is made eloquently and provocatively by Murray in his 1994 article, ‘Is 
Carver’s model really the one best way?’, repeated in Murray (1997) and echoed by 
Widmer and Houchin (2000).   
 
Many of the criticisms in Murray’s 1994 article are set out as separate criticisms in this 
paper.  The key argument now considered is this: 
 
The history, culture, personalities and environmental conditions of many 
nonprofits make it impossible for a Carver-type model to be sustained over time 
… When it comes to board governance patterns, hardy hybrids of many models 
flourish.  There really is no one best way. (Murray 1994, p. 14). 
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Carver has claimed Policy Governance to be ‘the most thoroughly thought-through, 
conceptually coherent and complete theory of governance in the world today’ (Carver 
2002, p. xl).  He argues that models are indeed most valuable when they seek universal 
applicability: 
 
Because as individuals we are all unique does not prevent physicians from 
learning how the liver functions as though we are all the same. (Carver 2002, p. 
xxxvi.) 
 
He says that a ‘theory that fits only one board isn’t very helpful’ (Carver 2002, p. xxxv) and 
what is needed is a ‘conceptually coherent, rigorously rational model’ (Carver 2002, p. 
45).  He argues persuasively against the ‘everybody’s different’ analysis of governance: 
 
For students of governance, settling to the ‘everybody’s different’ approach is 
either a truism or a dumbing-down … (Carver 2002, p. 46) 
 
Although Carver’s claim that there is no other coherent model of governance is immodest, 
it remains correct.  The other, so-called, models of governance fall into two categories.  
The first category of ‘models’ is merely descriptive of different categories of boards (see, 
for example, Lyons 2001, pp. 126-131).  These ‘models’ are clearly not intended to be 
conceptual models, but mere categorization.  The second category of models are merely 
lists of perceived better practice: for example, Bowen (1994), Chait, Holland and Taylor 
(1996), Eadie (2001), Houle (1997) and, Tyler Scott (2000).  In the latter category, there 
are striking omissions in the so-called models.   Even in Chait, Holland and Taylor (1996), 
the most coherent and best researched of the other approaches, the issue of delegation is 
not addressed.  This is surely a striking omission given that, outside of general meetings, 
the board is the source of power for action in the organisation’s name.  
 
The idea that governance can be distinguished from management is wrong 
Garber (2002) argues Policy Governance and other approaches distinguishing between 
governance and management operate in ‘splendid isolation from the day-to-day realities 
of the organization’ and ‘in real life, the differentiation is not so clear cut’.  Carver is not 
alone in making the distinction between governance and management, although perhaps 
there are few writers who are so rigorous about the distinction. 
 
It is true that the dividing line between governance and management is arbitrary.  In the 
Policy Governance model, management takes over where the board says it may.  Policy 
Governance is unique in allowing each party to know precisely what it is responsible for.  
That does not mean that the board will not seek management’s advice, or that 
management will not seek the advice of knowledgeable board members.  However, if the 
functions of governance and management are not conceptually different, then there is no 
reason to have a board. 
 
Separating policy from administration and ends from means, is fallacious 
Some authors treat these critiques as one and the same, although in reality they are not.  
Plunkett (n.d.) and Herman and Heimovics (1991, p. 43) argue that policy cannot be 
separated from administration.  To quote Plunkett (n.d., p. 8): 
 
the establishment of policy and its subsequent implementation must be seen as 
an interactive process involving those who have the power to decide policy and 
those who have the responsibility for managing its implementation. 
 
Carver is not in fact arguing for the absolute separation of policy and administration.  He 
explicitly states that in Policy Governance both the board and the CEO will make policy 
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(Carver 1997, p. 42).   What he does argue for is CEO policy being made in the context of 
board policy.   
 
The more important critique is the argument that ends and means cannot be 
distinguished.  Murray (1994) argues that:  
 
empirical research on strategic planning over the past decade has shown that 
this [distinguishing between ends and means in practice] is rarely the case.  
What actually happens is that strategies (ends) often emerge from actions 
(means) and the forces of strategic thinking and knowledge are to be found in all 
parts of the organization.  
 
Murray is incorrect in equating ‘strategies’ with Ends and ‘actions’ with means.  Ends can 
be correctly equated with outcomes, and the distinctive notion of outcomes is accepted in 
much of the planning literature.  Strategies, as well as ‘actions’, can be means. 
 
However, there may be some truth in Murray’s general point.  Mintzberg (1994, pp. 227-
228) presents a persuasive case about the fallacy of predetermination in planning: the 
idea that the organisation can impose its will on the environment and predict what 
outcomes it will have is fallacious.   
 
In Policy Governance, the prediction of outcomes is by means of the Ends policies.  
However, Policy Governance is considerably less deterministic than traditional strategic 
planning, where the prediction not only extends to the outcomes achieved, but even the 
strategies by which they will be achieved and the scheduling of those strategies.   
 
The critique of predeterminism is valid, while not invalidating the entire model.  Just as 
there are some outcomes that are not easily predicted, there are others that can 
reasonably be predicted.  In the former cases, a board should draft its Ends statement in 
terms of general outcomes more than precise outcomes.  Finally, if the Ends are not 
achieved, there is nothing in the model suggesting an automatic finding of fault on the part 
of the organisation, the board or the CEO.  The critique does point to the need for the 
model to be viewed and applied in a common sense manner. 
 
Carver’s model does not have regard to organisational life cycles 
This critique is implied by the works of Murray (1994) and Sharken Simon (2001).  
Sharken Simon (2001, p. 27) argues that concerns with governance vary with 
organisational age, with a true governance function and structure only emerging when 
enabled by the size and stability of the organization.   
 
The first point to note about this critique is that the empirical study of Dart et al (1996) 
found limited evidence to support the concept of organisational life cycles in boards. 
 
Stripped of its jargon, Policy Governance simply asserts that a board should specify: what 
outcomes the organisation seeks, the lawful delegation of its powers, its governance 
approach, and reporting and accountability.   Once the organisation is actually constituted 
(ie, it has moved to Sharken Simon’s stage 2), there is nothing about the model which 
suggests it is only suitable for organisations at a particular juncture in time.  Especially 
with all volunteer organisations, the delegation of powers makes sense as it enables the 
work of the organisation to get done.  There is no requirement in Policy Governance that 
delegation by the board be to one individual; all that is required is that the delegation and 
accountability be clear. 
 
This is not to deny that working boards and membership boards can be legitimate choices 
for those smaller nonprofits that want a high degree of whole-group involvement and 
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control.  However, working boards and membership boards can require enormous 
commitments of time and energy.  If the organisation grows to any great extent, working 
boards and membership boards are unlikely to be viable. 
 
Governance systems should be based around stakeholders more than ‘owners’ 
This heading captures a number of different but related critiques.  First, from a theoretical 
perspective, it can argued that governance is about mediating the diverse demands of 
stakeholders.  Second, critics argue that the conceptualisation of ownership is highly 
problematic, and indeed some nonprofit organisations have no identifiable owners.  Third, 
there are practical problems if the board distances itself from critical stakeholders who are 
not ‘owners’. 
 
The theoretical objection to the primacy of owners is implied in the work of Blair and Stout 
(1999).  Writing of for-profits, they argue that boards exist not to protect shareholders per 
se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members of the corporate 
team.  For the word ‘shareholder’, we might substitute the words ‘owner’ or ‘member’ in 
the case of nonprofits.  There are several responses to this argument.  First, Blair and 
Stout’s theory relates to public for-profit corporations, not nonprofits.  Second, the 
theoretical basis for their work is the economic problems of shirking and haggling (Blair 
and Stout 1999, p. 266).  These problems do not apply (in the way Blair and Stout 
describe the problems) to nonprofits due to the distribution constraint.  Third, as 
previously noted, members do indeed have special legal rights that are not accorded to 
other stakeholders.  In summary, team production theory is largely irrelevant to nonprofits.   
 
The second objection to the ownership concept is Murray’s argument that the concept is 
vague.  Murray (1994, p. 11) states that many nonprofits have multiple owners who ‘are 
virtually impossible to distinguish from stakeholders whose interests and influences 
determine the survival of the organisation’.   This argument is fortified by the example of 
long-established charitable trusts, which have no identifiable owners. 
 
Carver (2002, p. 55) recognises that there are rare instances when the ownership concept 
might not apply.  However, he argues that, in most cases, it does, and that board authority 
must come from the legal or moral owners of the organisation.  Carver does not deny the 
importance of stakeholders such as staff or clients, their interests and of consultation with 
them, but simply states these relationships do not have the same special significance 
(Carver 2002, p. 50).  The board’s authority pre-exists the relationship with staff or clients: 
 
Before jobs are created, a reason for operating must exist … If the governing 
body is given authority to choose which beneficiaries will be served and with 
what benefits, it will make that choice on somebody’s behalf. (Carver 2002, p. 57) 
 
To summarise the discussion on this second objection, the ownership concept is useful 
and relevant in most but not all cases.  In the unusual case of organisations without 
owners, Carver’s statement of the role of the board would have to be modified.  In relation 
to non-owner stakeholders, if a board wishes to give greater emphasis to the view of 
stakeholders, it can do so – and perhaps should do so - through Executive Limitation and 
Governance Process policies.     
 
The third basis of objection is the practical consequence of use of the model on 
relationships with management and staff.  Bradshaw et al (1998, p. 15) note that ‘board 
and staff relations are vulnerable and disconnected because of the emphasis on separate 
and distinct roles’.  However, the danger of disconnection is easily overcome in ways that 
do not jeopardise the model, e.g., joint social events, joint education programs, 
presentations by staff to the board, etc.  This objection can be easily overcome by 
sensitive implementation. 
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There is a lack of empirical research in relation to the operation of the model 
Of all the critiques of the Policy Governance model, this is the most important.  Although 
criticism and replies can be made from a theoretical or anecdotal perspective, there is no 
substitute for properly constructed empirical research.  As Jackson and Holland (1998, p. 
159) tartly observe of Carver and other writers: 
 
There is no dearth of advice for nonprofit boards … almost entirely based on 
subjective individual experience and anecdotal evidence.  It fails to provide any 
systematic, empirically tested basis for setting standards, measuring 
performance, or examining the extent to which board performance may affect the 
work of the organization. 
 
Or, as Murray (1997, p. 441) writes: 
 
One would have hoped that after six years of working with hundreds of nonprofits 
in trying to implement the policy governance model, Carver would now publish a 
thoughtful appraisal of the successes and failures with pertinent examples. 
 
Carver (2002, p. 37) himself acknowledges ‘that the extensive claims for Policy 
Governance cry out for research’. 
 
There are three empirical studies which have been published looking, either exclusively or 
in part, at Policy Governance.  The first study is that of Brudney and Murray (1998), which 
looks at intentional efforts, including Policy Governance, to improve board performance2.  
The study consisted of 851 chief executive officers of Canadian nonprofits.  Respondents 
were specifically asked whether they had used the Carver or other formal models for 
board change.  One hundred and fifty four respondents had applied Carver’s model 
exclusively and another 37 had adopted aspects of the Carver model.  CEOs whose 
boards had used a model were more likely to report the changes as being successful.  In 
relation to the particular models, Brudney and Murray found: 
 
no one model or combination of models proved to be more significantly 
associated with perceived success than any other.  This finding could have 
resulted because no model was in fact more successful than any other, because 
some models were applied ineptly, or because the CEO respondents tended to 
believe in the models adopted by their boards, whatever they might be, and 
therefore had a biased tendency to view them as effective. (1998, p. 343) 
 
Carver has no problem with the qualified and tentative nature of Brudney and Murrays’ 
conclusions, but more with the possible interpretations of the conclusions.  Carver points 
out that self-reported ‘Carver users’ should not be confused with actual users.  Also, 
satisfaction, ‘useful as that information might be’, might not be associated with 
effectiveness (Carver 2002, p. 37). 
 
The second study is that by Brudney & Nobbie (2000).  This is a more limited study, 
involving North American consultants/trainers who participated in Carver’s Policy 
Governance Academy.  Forty-six consultants responded3.   Preliminary analysis revealed 
that: 
                                                
2 There is an interesting series of publications about this research, with the authors becoming ever 
more tentative in their conclusions.  See Carver 2002, p. 36. 
3 The author has not been able to obtain the full paper and therefore has to rely on the abstract. 
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• the majority of consultants taught the model as a conceptual whole, rather than 
teaching only parts 
• larger board size (over 15 members), older organisations (over 10 years old) and no 
hierarchy between board and staff all negatively impacted implementation 
• board members experienced ‘moderate difficulty in several areas focusing solely on 
the policy-making aspect of the model’, and 
• the consultants were in consensus in believing that the model has the potential to 
improve performance in all types of nonprofit organisations. 
 
Brudney and Nobbies’ findings are more important for what they do not find, than what 
they do.  If the study had found that the consultants considered the model impractical, 
then that would have been a significant finding.  However, it is hardly surprising that 
consultants, who had voluntarily elected to pay thousands of dollars to attend a five-day 
course with Carver, believed the model has the potential to improve board performance. 
 
The third empirical study on Policy Governance is that of Gordon (2000).  He studied 
judgements of board effectiveness by board members and CEOs in 32 United States 
organisations, some of which used Policy Governance and others traditional 
governance4, using the Board Self-Assessment Questionnaire (BSAQ).  The BSAQ is 
based on Jackson and Holland’s (1998) ‘Six Dimensions’ of board competence.  Although 
CEOs of Policy Governance boards believed that their boards were more effective in the 
contextual competency, the study concluded that overall Policy Governance is equally as 
effective as traditional governance practices. 
 
There are two issues that should be considered in relation to Gordon’s study.  First, 
although the study appears well constructed, there are major differences between the 
response rate of the Policy Governance boards and that of the traditional boards to the 
invitation to participate in the study.  Thirty two percent of the former choose to participate, 
whereas a mere 5% of the latter did so (Gordon 2000, p. 48).  Gordon (2000, p. 78) 
acknowledges the possibility of inherent bias in the sample in that only those 
organisations that considered themselves to be performing well participated.  Given the 
disparate rates of participation, this inherent bias could have been more pronounced in 
the traditional boards.5
 
Second, there is the question of the appropriateness of the BSAQ instrument.  Although 
the instrument has been reasonably well validated, Jackson and Holland (1998, p. 168) 
concede that reliability, face validity and content validity all ‘suffer a sort of theoretical 
incestuousness’ and content validity depends on the theory being used.  In the case of the 
BSAQ, the theoretical model is the ‘Six Dimensions’ approach.  A perusal of the BSAQ 
shows that few of the questions relate to such issues as appropriate delegation and 
control, or accountability of the CEO.  These are issues which are presumably important 
issues for governance effectiveness, on which Policy Governance boards should perform 
very well by comparison to traditional boards.  Also, it should be noted that the Jackson 
                                                
4 Gordon defines ‘traditional boards’ as boards that do not use Policy Governance (Gordon 2000, 
p. 47).  More accurately, his comparison is between Policy Governance boards and non-Policy 
Governance boards of any description. 
5 It would not be surprising if some or most of the so-called ‘traditional’ boards had participated in 
board improvement efforts.  If so, this still raises the interesting possibility that the exact approach 
to board improvement does not really matter, as long as some attempt is made.  This would be 
consistent with one possible interpretation of the Brudney and Murray (1997) research. 
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and Holland study demonstrates correlation between board practice and organisation 
outcomes, not causation (1998, p. 176). 
 
This discussion highlights the dilemmas of current research into board effectiveness.   All 
of the studies on the links between board effectiveness and organisational effectiveness 
are about correlation, not causation (Herman & Renz 2000, p. 5).   Indeed, it will be 
difficult to undertake research demonstrating the impact of various governance 
frameworks on organisational performance, given the difficulty of identifying sufficient 
cases to permit multivariate analysis (Herman & Renz 2000, p. 7).  Also, there is a 
problematic conceptual argument: should board performance be judged on the basis of 
organisational performance?   On the one hand, it is easy to argue that board impact on 
organisational performance is the ultimate test.  On the other hand, it can also be argued 
that organisational performance should be judged principally on the basis of what the 
owners of the organisation want, rather than on the basis of what outside observers deem 
important (Carver 2002, pp. 29-34). 
 
To summarise on this point, the relative lack of empirical study into Policy Governance is 
a significant concern.   A close eye should be kept on future empirical studies to see what 
light they shed on the effectiveness of the Policy Governance model and of other 
approaches. 
 
The model is for heroic boards and perfect CEOs 
It is well known that nonprofit boards seldom meet normative standards for governance 
(Herman & Renz 2000, p. 2).   The ‘heroic boards’ critique is simply that only heroic 
boards will pursue these normative standards.  Herman (1989, quoted in Herman and 
Heimovics 1999, p. 45) applied the term not only to the Carver model, but to other 
normative approaches such as that of Chait and Taylor as well.  The ‘heroic boards’ 
critique of Policy Governance is reflected in Murray (1994) and in Murray (1997).  Murray 
(1994) argues that the successful operation of the model not only requires perfect board 
members, but perfect CEOs as well.   
 
The implementation of the model requires considerable discipline on the part of board 
members and CEOs, but the maintenance of the model requires even more effort over 
time.  The model assumes that the majority of board members will ensure that: 
 
• organisational politics are conducted in a principled way 
• representations by board members on their own behalf or on behalf of 
clients/constituents or staff will always be conducted having regard to the board’s 
policy framework and the ‘any reasonable interpretation’ rule 
• board members will only be concerned about CEO achievement of Ends and the 
avoidance of unacceptable means, and not about matters of CEO personality and 
interpersonal style (not covered by Executive Limitation policies), and  
• board members will not evaluate formally or informally the work of other staff. 
 
In the absence of empirical studies on longevity of the model in organisations, there is no 
way of knowing whether most organisations that attempt to use the model sustain it over 
time or whether, as Murray (1994) asserts, this is an impossibility. 
 
The author’s own consulting experience suggests that sustainability of the model will vary 
by organisation.  Of the eight organisations that the author has helped to implement Policy 
Governance, six, and possibly seven, organisations have sustained the model over time, 
albeit for relatively short periods of between two and three years since implementation.  In 
a number of cases there has still been tension between the board and the CEO.  
However, the level of conflict is reasonably consistent with that in client organisations 
which use a different approach to governance.  The one spectacular failure of Policy 
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Governance was in an organisation with a predominantly political mode of operation, 
where the model was abandoned de facto after a dramatic change in board leadership.  
Clearly, the Policy Governance model is not appropriate for those boards which are 
incapable of moving beyond a political style of operation. 
 
There is much to be said for the claim that Policy Governance and other normative 
approaches to governance are indeed for ‘heroic’ boards.  However, to use a double 
negative, Herman and Heimovics (1991, p. 58) were not urging boards not to attempt to 
be heroic, but merely arguing that boards were more likely to meet normative standards 
with the help of the CEO. 
 
It might also be that empirical research will demonstrate that the model might not be 
sustainable over time in some organisations.   However, for most organisations using the 
model, this might be more a question of implementation and maintenance strategies, such 
as ensuring training for new board members, rather than fundamental questions of 
impracticality. 
 
The model does not recognise the reality of CEO-centrality 
This critique is implied in the work of Herman and Heimovics (1991) and made explicitly 
by Block (1998).  Herman and Heimovics argue for a ‘board-centred’ approach to CEO 
leadership, where the CEO is seen as pivotal to the success of the board.  The difference 
between the ‘board-centred’ approach and Block’s ‘executive director-concerted 
leadership’ approach is not altogether clear, but seems to be that Block’s emphasis on the 
role of the CEO is even more pronounced.  He explicitly states that CEOs should: 
 
Be thankful for what you get and do the rest by yourself, alone, with staff, with 
consultants, or other volunteers … (Block 1998, p. 137) 
 
There is some substance to these claims, and Block’s practical suggestions to CEOs on 
how to engage or not engage their board members appear useful (for example, Block 
1998, p. 136-138).   
 
Carver also sees the CEO as having a critical role in governance, with recommendations 
that the CEO be obliged to ensure that the board is aware ‘of relevant trends, anticipated 
adverse media coverage, material external and internal changes,’ and that the CEO 
provides the board with ‘as many staff and external points of view, issues, and options as 
needed for fully informed board choices’ (Carver & Carver 1997, p. 196). 
 
However, there is a fundamental problem with taking the ‘board-centred leadership’ 
approach to the extreme position of Block’s ‘executive director-concerted leadership’.  The 
board is ultimately accountable to the membership (in most organisations) and for legal 
compliance.  A board that fails to ensure appropriate structure, processes and practice 
does so at its peril. 
 
To summarise on this point, the Carver model does place sufficient emphasis on the role 
of the CEO. 
 
Conclusion 
 
It has been demonstrated that some of the criticisms of Carver’s views and the Policy 
Governance model are based on fundamental misunderstandings of his work.  Although 
this raises the question of whether the model is simply too complex to be understood even 
by academic writers, the reality is that the principles and the model are not ‘rocket 
science’.  They certainly are different to traditional governance practice, and their 
divergence from tradition makes them foreign and difficult for some board members 
Centre of Philanthropy and Nonprofit Studies  Working Paper No. CPNS6 
 
 13
experienced in the traditional mode.  However, the principles and the model are 
essentially straightforward. 
 
Of the numerous objections that have been raised to Policy Governance, there are only 
two deserving weight of any significance.  The first is the lack of empirical verification of 
the model.  As already noted, this problem is not confined to Policy Governance, but 
applies to many other approaches to governance as well.  Even with the ‘Six Dimensions’ 
approach, which has been subject to extensive empirical investigation, studies have only 
demonstrated correlation between board performance and organisational performance. 
 
The second objection is related to the first.  Until such time as there are properly 
structured empirical studies on the longevity of Policy Governance in adopting 
organisations, it cannot be known whether the model is, or is not, sustainable given the 
realities of nonprofit boards.  Although the author’s own consulting experience 
demonstrates that many organisations can sustain the model for at least two or three 
years since implementation, there only remains anecdotal evidence of organisations 
maintaining the model for longer periods.  The lack of empirical demonstration of 
sustainability in the long term is true for all so-called ‘heroic’ approaches to governance. 
This paper does point to the need to implement Policy Governance in a common-sense 
way, and to the importance of maintenance strategies such as training for new board 
members. 
 
In summary, until there are appropriate empirical studies conducted on Policy 
Governance, the jury will and must remain out on whether Policy Governance is 
sustainable over the medium and long term and on any factors contributing to long-term 
sustainability. 
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